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Abstract 
 
The global financial crisis in 2008 increased the hit of business failure. The Chinese 
economy is also affected by the recent global financial crisis given the fact that Chinese 
economy depends heavily on international trade. Our study tries to find the determinants of 
bankruptcy in Chinese firms. Both logit and survival model analyses provide consistent 
results on the determinants in predicting distressed firms in China.  Our results suggest that 
firms with liquidity problems and firms experiencing decline in profits are more likely to 
file for bankruptcy. In addition, we find that, compared to state-owned enterprises, 
collectively-owned enterprises, private-owned enterprises, and foreign owned businesses 
are more likely to file for bankruptcy.  This conclusion is robust after controlling for 
regional differences. The findings of this study show that the financial variables developed 
by Altman (1968) and Ohlson (1980) perform reasonably well in determining business 
failures of Chinese firms. In addition, our bankruptcy prediction rates are 89% and these 
rates are similar to those of previous U.S. studies. 
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The Determinants of Bankruptcy for Chinese Firms 
 
I. Introduction 
            The global financial crisis in 2008 increased the hit of business failure. For example, 
Thurston (2009) documents that the number of bankruptcies in Puerto Rico reached at a 
starling rate in February 2009 with a 28% increase in overall bankruptcy filings and a 29% 
increase in commercial bankruptcy filings due to local and global recessions that exert 
pressure on island businesses and personal finances. Most notably, even major U. S firms 
such as Chrysler and General Motors filed for bankruptcy (Warburton 2010). The Chinese 
economy is also affected by the recent global financial crisis given the fact that Chinese 
economy depends heavily on international trade. After the Composite Index of Shanghai 
Exchange climbing to a meteoric peak with 6,124 points on October 16, 2007, the stock 
market in China quickly collapsed in 2008 (Yao and Luo 2008). Therefore, China was also 
experiencing a surge of bankruptcy (Wang and Campbell 2010). An interesting question is 
to examine which factors contribute to business failure. This study examines the 
effectiveness of a set of financial variables used previously by Altman (1968) and Ohlson 
(1980) in predicting Chinese business failure. The findings of this study have implications 
to decision makers because many stakeholders such as bankers, investors, auditors, 
management, and the general public are interested in identifying the potential failing firms.  
            Most of the current literature in predicting business failures uses data from United 
States firms (Kwak et al. 2006; Mansi et al. 2010). Little research has been done to 
investigate the determinants of bankruptcy for Chinese firms. We use Chinese financial 
data to analyze bankrupt firms in the Chinese capital market environment which may not 
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be the same as that of the U.S. capital market due to historical, cultural, and political 
differences.  For example, Chinese government policies affect the financial outcomes of 
firms directly and indirectly and usually only state-owned enterprises (hereafter SOEs) are 
protected by the government.2   
            Our paper differs from previous research (for example, Wu and Lu, 2001; Wang 
and Campbell 2010) examining firm bankruptcy in China in several important ways. First, 
our determination of bankruptcy is based on the survey data, which clearly specify the 
status of firm such as on-going operations or bankruptcy.  A recent Chinese bankruptcy 
study by Wang and Campbell (2010) treated delisted firms as bankruptcy firms, which 
restrict the generalizability of the prediction models given that the use of delisted firms is 
inaccurate in bankruptcy studies.  Second, this study extends the literature by empirically 
testing whether our model using Chinese financial data performs as effectively as it did 
using U.S. financial data. China's Enterprise Bankruptcy Law (EBL) shares many common 
features with Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.3  China’s Enterprise Bankruptcy 
Law is similar to Chapter 11 of the U.S. bankruptcy law by allowing incumbent managers 
to operate the firm and execute the work-out plan. The enactment of “Bankruptcy Law” 
highlighted the importance of using profit as a measure of operating efficiency. We also 
employ both logit and survival model approaches for bankruptcy analyses and these 
approaches enable us to generate consistent and unbiased results in the determination of a 
                                                     
2 SOEs are business entities established by central and local governments (National Bureau of Statistics of 
China).  
3 The Chinese Enterprise Bankruptcy Law was first passed in 1986. On June 1, 2007, the new Enterprise 
Bankruptcy Law replaced the 1986 law. China's Enterprise Bankruptcy Law allows now filings to be 
voluntary or involuntary, favors a debtor-in-possession structure and reorganizations over liquidations, and 
includes the features for creditors to file proofs of claims and receive distributions.  
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firm’s bankruptcy risk. Finally, we include Chinese ownership types into the testing 
models to control for cultural and social differences between China and U.S. capital 
markets. Our results improve our understanding of Chinese corporate governance issues 
that could potentially affect the likelihood of firm bankruptcy.  
             Using 1999-2007 Chinese firm level financial data, our logit and survival model 
analyses provide consistent results on the determinants of distressed firms in China.  The 
regression results suggest that firms with current liquidity problems and firms experiencing 
decline in profits are more likely to file for bankruptcy. In addition, we find that as 
compared to SOEs, the collectively-owned enterprises, private-owned enterprises, and 
foreign owned businesses are more likely to file for bankruptcy.  The relatively low 
incidence of bankruptcy in SOEs may be explained by the fact that SOEs benefit from a 
series of government preferences. For example, SOEs are given preferences to access 
cheaper land, lower interest bank loans, and cheaper energy sources.4 So the government 
policies in China create a favorable competitive environment for SOEs relative to other 
types of business firms.  
 Our paper is organized as follows.  The next section reviews previous bankruptcy 
studies relevant to this study.  The third section describes data collection and research 
methodology.  The fourth section presents our logit and survival model analysis results.  
The fifth section reports and discusses the regression results. Conclusion follows in the last 
section with limitations of our paper and future research avenues.  
 
                                                     
4 Bloomberg Business Week, May 21 –May 27, 2012 
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II. Literature Review 
 Altman (1968) did a seminal work in bankruptcy studies by using multiple 
discriminant analysis (MDA). Later, Ohlson (1980) used a logit model which does not 
require any assumptions about the prior probability of bankruptcy or the distribution of 
predictor variables, which is a limitation of Altman’s study.  Besides Altman (1968) and 
Ohlson (1980), researchers in accounting and finance developed other methods to predict 
firms’ financial distress. For example, Clark and Ofek (1994) included abnormal stock 
returns as a measure of financial distress. Sung et al. (1999) used a decision tree approach 
for a bankruptcy prediction model.  Shin and Lee (2002) used a genetic algorithm (GA) in 
a bankruptcy prediction model, but computational costs of this model can be too expensive 
and there is no guarantee of optimality. Freed and Glover (1986) proposed linear 
programming (LP) to minimize misclassifications in linear discriminant analysis.  
Recently, Kwak et al. (2006) proposed a Multiple Criteria Linear Programming (MCLP) 
model to data mining for bankruptcy prediction using U.S. data. Despite a variety of 
models available, past literature (Boritz et al. 2007; Charitou et al. 2004) indicates most 
international failure prediction studies rely on the models constructed by Altman (1968) 
and Ohlson (1980).  
 This study uses a set of financial variables developed by Altman (1968) and Ohlson 
(1980) to predict Chinese business failure. In addition to the classical logit model, we 
employ a survival model with the intent of generating consistent and unbiased results in the 
determination of firms’ bankruptcy risk.  Shumway (2001) summarizes the following 
econometric advantages of a survival model over a static logit model. First, survival 
models incorporate time-varying covariates that enable the financial data to reveal a firm’s 
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changing health over time. Second, survival models produce more efficient out-of-sample 
forecasts by utilizing much more data. For example, if firms in the sample have an average 
of 10 years of observations, then about 10 times more data are available to estimate the 
survival model than the static logit model. 5 
 The Chinese firm level data not only allow us to look at the effects of financial 
variables on bankruptcy, but also allow us to provide evidence regarding the impact of 
business ownerships on the likelihood of business failure by comparing SOEs vs. private 
and foreign-owned enterprises. The Chinese capital market may not be the same as that of 
U.S. due to social, cultural, and political differences.  Chinese economy has become more 
market‐oriented since China started its breathtaking economic reform in the late 1970s. 
The most dramatic change is the introduction of private enterprises and foreign-controlled 
enterprises into what had been completely dominated by SOEs in a planned economy 
(Szamosszegi et al. 2011).6 The rise of other business enterprises and the introduction of 
market-based pricing have shifted Chinese economy from a planned to a market-oriented 
system.7 China has two stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen. Hundreds of Chinese 
                                                     
5 Although survival analysis accommodates more information of individual firms through multi-period 
analysis, the selection bias is inherent in the survival model because the selection of sample firms is biased 
from the beginning.  
6 Private enterprises are the economic units invested in or controlled by natural persons who hire workers for 
profit‐making activities. Private enterprises include private limited liability corporations, private 
share‐holding corporations, private partnership enterprises and private sole investment enterprises. 
Foreign-controlled enterprises are defined as follows “All industrial enterprises registered as the 
joint‐venture, cooperative, sole (exclusive) investment industrial enterprises and limited liability 
corporations with funds from foreign funds or fund from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan (Source: National 
Bureau of Statistics of China).” 
7 For example, the size of China's private enterprises ranges from 11 to 30 percent in 2009 based on various 
indicators such as gross industrial output value, value added by industrial enterprises, investment in fixed 
assets, employment in urban areas, and taxes paid by industrial enterprises (National Bureau of Statistics of 
China 2010) 
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firms have their listings in foreign stock exchanges. The dynamic transition leaves many 
questions to explore. For example, does China’s reliance on private enterprises and 
market‐oriented system shrink the role of SOEs in affecting the economic growth?  Or does 
the economic reform make SOEs more or less likely to go out of business?  
To the best of our knowledge, there are no clear answers for these questions. The 
impact of Chinese regulatory environment on the performance of SOEs is clearly a 
two-edged sword. On one hand, SOEs face unprecedented challenges. The economic 
reform brings intense pressure and competitions to SOEs due to the rise of the 
foreign-controlled business and private sectors. The SOEs have been shrinking through 
substantial downsizing and restructuring (Ralston et al. 2004).8 China’s admission to the 
WTO in 2001 has facilitated the de-regulation of formerly protected sectors such as 
financial institutions, telecommunications, automobiles, pharmaceuticals, and 
petrochemicals (China Business Review 2002).  Furthermore, the enactment of 
“Bankruptcy Law” in the 1990s highlighted the importance of using profit as a measure of 
efficiency and laid the infrastructure to punish business failure (Steinfeld 1998).   On the 
other hand, SOEs are operated in a favored position due to the preferential government 
policies. SOEs benefit from a series of government policies in China. Specifically, 
stated-owned enterprises have preferential access to production inputs and capital. For 
example, SOEs are in a favored position to access cheap bank capital.  Beyond the huge 
advantage in raising funds, SOEs receive favorable tax treatment (Szamosszegi et al. 
2011).    A recent study by Szamosszegi, Anderson and Kyle (2009) investigates the 
                                                     
8 China’s National Bureau of Statistics show that the overall share of industrial outputs from SOEs has 
declined from 57 percent to 34 percent over the last decade (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2010).  
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benefits received by the listed SOEs using data from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. 
SOEs today dominate aviation, railways, steel, telecom, finance, petroleum, highways, 
insurance, postal services, and electricity.9  In comparison, private and foreign-owned 
firms are more competitive but operated in a less favorable environment where external 
financing is difficult to obtain. Chen Jun, vice chairman of the Zhejiang Chamber of 
Commerce of Beijing, says “state banks rarely give loans to private enterprises and the 
resulting credit crunch leads many private enterprises to go bankrupt”.10 Ironically, despite 
disadvantages with their operating environments, private and foreign-owned enterprises 
are more productive than SOEs. For example, private enterprises are more than twice as 
productive as SOEs.11 In the last decade private enterprises have grown more rapidly than 
SOEs but with a disproportionately small share of credit from bank.12 Foreign businesses 
and firms outside of mainland China are exposed to foreign culture and, therefore, they are 
more likely to run the business with more advanced management styles. Foreign-owned 
enterprises accounted for 12 percent of the national total investment and 17 percent of 
gross industrial output (National Bureau of Statistics 2003: 459, 469).  
  
III. Data Collection and Research Design 
Data collection process 
                                                     
9 Bloomberg Business Week, May 21 –May 27, 2012 
10 Bloomberg Business Week, May 21 –May 27, 2012 
11 Private enterprises are 70 percent more productive than SOEs and collective enterprises are nearly as 
productive as private enterprises (Economic Survey of China 2005). Collective enterprises are economic 
entities where assets are owned collectively (National Bureau of Statistics of China).  
12According to McKinsey Global Institute (2006) report, wholly state-owned enterprises account for 23 
percent of GDP but 35 percent of corporate loans outstanding.  
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 Our dataset are purchased from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). The 
Annual Survey of Industrial Production includes all state-owned firms and private firms 
with at least 5 million Yuan in annual sales from 1999 to 2007.  For each year, we look for 
the operational status indicating bankruptcy to identify bankrupt firms. We are unable to 
identify the bankrupt firm in 2001 and 2004 as the survey data combined bankrupt firms 
with other exit firms and labeled them “cancellation”. To ensure a clean sample for testing, 
we delete observations in year 2001 and 2004.  We checked the data for consistency and 
excluded observations with missing or inconsistent information (e.g., negatively reported 
Total Assets). To exclude extreme values, we winsorized the lower and upper 1% of the 
thirteen financial ratios. Each financial ratio is calculated using accounting variables from 
one year prior to bankruptcy to ten years prior to bankruptcy to be included in our 
bankruptcy models.  We used annual accounting data in our study.  To emulate the real 
world bankruptcy situation, for each experimental firm, we collected 10 times matching 
control firms based on size, year, and two-digit industry code.  Our final experimental 
group is 394 bankrupt firms from 1999 to 2007 (excluding 2001 and 2004) to be included 
in both logit and survival analyses. Finally, we obtain a sample of 193,566 firm-year 
observations.   
 Determinants of Bankruptcy 
            In prior literature such as Altman (1968) and Ohlson (1980), bankruptcy is 
predicted by financial indicators. Based on the implications of these financial variables, we 
classify them into the following four factor groups.  
1. Liquidity 
Liquidity is a prime concern of bankruptcy. When firm liquidity worsens, it may 
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ultimately lead to business failure. Following Altman (1968) and Ohlson (1980) 
studies, we use WCA_TA (Working Capital divided by Total Assets), TL_TA (Total 
Liabilities divided by Total Assets), CL_CA (Total Current Liabilities divided by 
Total Current Assets), OENEG (equal to 1 if TL_TA is greater than one), FU_TL 
(Funds from Operations divided by Total Liabilities), and BV_TD (Book Value of 
Equity divided by Total Debt) to capture liquidity. Of the six liquidity indicators, 
WCA_TA and BV_TD are the two from Altman’s (1968) model.  Variables 
WCA_TA and CL_CA are used to measure short-term liquidity, while TL_TA, 
OENEG, FU_TL, and BV_TD are used to measure long-term solvency. The lower 
the current ratio and equity to debt ratio, and/or the higher debt to asset ratio, the 
higher the possibility of being bankrupt. 
2.  Profitability  
Ohlson (1980) finds that profits deteriorate as firms move from nonbankruptcy to 
bankruptcy status. As documented by Altman (1968) and Ohlson (1980), we use 
TP_TA (the ratio of Earnings before Interest and Taxes to Total Assets), NI_TA 
(Net Income divided by Total Assets), INTWO (equal to 1 if net income for the past 
two years is negative), and CHGIN (Change in Net Income, divided by the sum of 
absolute net income for the last two years) to proxy for firm profitability. TP_TA 
ratio is the measure of firm profits apart from any tax and leveraging factors. It is an 
important predictor of firm bankruptcy given the fact that a firm’s existence 
depends on the earning power of its assets (Altman 1968). Ohlson (1980) uses 
NI_TA, CHGIN, and INTWO to measure firm profits net of income taxes. As 
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suggested by Ohlson (1980), poorer performance measures increase the probability 
of business failure.          
3. Operational efficiency 
Inefficient use of assets could be a contributing factor of business failure. Altman 
(1968) posits that the ratio of Sales to Total Assets (SALE_TA) reflects the ability of 
a firm’s assets in generating sales revenues. We use this asset turnover ratio to 
evaluate the effectiveness of a company in managing its assets. The higher the 
SALE_TA ratio, the better the management's capability to generate revenues.  
4. Firm characteristics  
Size (SIZE) is measured as the logarithm of total assets. Ohlson (1980) finds 
smaller firms have higher risk of being bankrupt. In addition, we use the ratio of 
Retained Earnings to Total Assets (RE_TA) to examine the impact of firm life cycle 
on the likelihood of bankruptcy. Young firms have a higher chance of being 
classified as bankrupt than more established firms, since young firms have not had 
enough time to build cumulative profits (Altman 1968). The ratio of retained 
earnings to total assets captures the extent to which assets have been paid for by 
cumulative profits.  
           This study uses the above thirteen financial statement measures to evaluate the 
predictive ability of financial distress for bankruptcy decisions. An alternative approach in 
measuring distressed firms is the use of Altman (1968)’s Z score.13 Altman’s Z-score can 
                                                     
13 Altman (1968) utilized a statistical technique called discriminate analysis to develop a financial distress 
metric, called Z-score. The current form of the model is expressed as the follows:  
Z=1.2X1+1.4X2+3.3X3+0.6X4+0.999X5 
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be used as a strategic and performance management tool (Calandro, 2007), but the use of 
an index or a variation of Z-score, as with Chen et al. (2009), instead of a portfolio of 
financial ratios may result in loss of information, and the index could be biased based on 
the time period used to estimate the coefficients.  The use of a Z-score single variable for 
financial distress may not capture as much information about financial conditions as a 
portfolio of financial statement ratios.  Thus we use a portfolio of the thirteen variables in 
our main models to identify the potential factors that contribute to business failure.  As a 
sensitivity check, we compare Altman’s Z-score between bankrupt and non-bankrupt 
firms.  
 
 IV. Empirical Results 
 Table 1 (panel A and panel B) shows the descriptive statistics of Chinese bankrupt 
and non-bankrupt control firms between 1999 and 2007.  Turning first to the measures of 
liquidity, the means of Total Liabilities divided by Total Assets (TL_TA), indicator 
variable OENEG equal to 1 if TL_TA is greater than one, and Total Current Liabilities 
divided by Current Assets (CL_CA) in bankrupt firms (TL_TA = 0.72, OENEG = 0.19, and 
CL_CA = 1.61) are much higher than in non-bankrupt control firms (TL_TA = 0.63, 
OENEG = 0.08, and CL_CA = 1.16). T-statistics indicate that the differences are 
significant (t = 9.28 with TL_TA, t = 15.35 with OENEG, and t =2.56 with CL_CA). The 
                                                                                                                                                              
Where Z   =  Z-Score; 
             X1 = Working capital divided by total assets; 
             X2 = Retained earnings divided by total assets; 
             X3 = Earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets; 
             X4 = Market value of equity divided by total liabilities; 
             X5 = Sales divided by total assets;  
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results show that bankrupt firms have liquidity problems and they are unable to pay their 
incoming debts.  Next, relative to non-bankrupt control firms, bankrupt firms have worse 
ratios of firm profitability. Means of Net Income divided by Total Assets (NI_TA), 
Retained Earnings divided by Total Assets (RE_TA), Total Profits divided by Total Assets 
(TP_TA), indicator variable INTWO equal to 1 if Net Income for the past two years is 
negative, and change in Net Income relative to Total Assets (CHGIN) in bankrupt firms are 
0.02, -0.03, 0.06, 0.23, and -0.08, respectively, which are significantly lower than those in 
non-bankrupt firms. Again, t-tests suggest that such differences are statistically significant. 
Moreover, as shown in Table 1, the mean of Sales to Total Assets in bankrupt firms 
(SALE_TA = 1.43) is much lower than that of non-bankrupt firms (SALE_TA = 2.06), 
suggesting that bankrupt firms are less efficient in managing their assets relative to 
non-bankrupt firms.  Overall, our findings suggest that Chinese bankrupt firms maintain 
higher debt ratios and have poorer firm performance. This is consistent with the literature 
documented in previous studies.  
We also compare Altman’s Z-score between bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms. The 
results show that Altman’s Z-score is much lower in bankrupt firms (mean Z-score = 2.66) 
than non-bankrupt firms (Z-score = 3.96), significant at the 1 percent level. Our evidence 
on Z-scores in Chinese firms also supports Altman’s interpretations that companies with 
Z-scores above 2.9 are considered to be healthy (Safe Zone), companies with Z-scores 
below 1.23 are considered to be financially distressed (Distress Zone), and companies with  
Z-scores between 1.23 and 2.9 are considered to be in a grey area (Grey Zone).  
                                                    ------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 here 
------------------------------ 
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 Table 2 separately shows the distribution of bankrupt firms by year and by 
ownership. We can see that bankruptcy reaches the highest point in 2003, comprising 
29.49% of the sample firms. This number is much higher than that of the U.S. around same 
time period because of the non-mature Chinese capital market structure. Our survey data 
classify ownership as the follows: SOEs, collectively owned, private with shareholding, 
private with personal capital, companies in Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan (HKMT), 
foreign-owned businesses, and others. SOEs (ownership 1) and private-owned enterprises 
(ownership 4) are the two biggest types of ownership in filing for bankruptcy.  
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 here 
------------------------------ 
 
 Table 3 presents Pearson Correlations of financial variables. Some of the variables 
are highly correlated, which is not surprising given that we use multiple variables to 
capture liquidity and firm profitability. We find that Total Liabilities/Total Assets (TL_TA) 
is positively correlated with Total Current Liabilities/Total Current Assets (CL_CA). In 
addition, TL_TA is negatively associated with Net Income/Total Assets (NI_TA) and 
Retained Earnings/Total Assets (RE_TA). Notably, Working Capital/Total Assets 
(WCA_TA) is highly correlated with TL_TA (coefficient = - 0.64) and RE_TA (coefficient = 
0.46). The findings in Table 3 are consistent with the notion that firms with liquidity 
problems are more likely to have poor firm performance.  
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3 here 
------------------------------ 
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Table 4 presents the results of logit and survival model using the defined financial 
variables.  In an attempt to determine whether the context of organizational cultures in 
China could affect the probability of failure, we include the type of ownership. We also 
include year, industry, and region dummies to control for firm fixed-effects. Logit model 1 
and survival model 4 predict bankruptcy with Altman’s five variables only. The results of 
Table 4 show that the coefficients of Earnings Before Interest and Taxes/Total Assets 
(TP_TA) are significantly negative across the two models (coefficient on TP_TA = -1.394 
in model 1 and coefficient on TP_TA = -1.791 in model 4), suggesting that the likelihood of 
bankruptcy is higher for firms with lower profits. In addition, we find that the coefficients 
on Sales/Total Assets (SALE_TA) are negative, significant at the 10 percent level, but the 
magnitude is relatively small (coefficient on SALE_TA = -0.07 in model 1 and coefficient 
on SALE_TA = -0.085 in model 4). These findings indicate that poor firm performance and 
inefficient use of assets increase the likelihood of bankruptcy.  
The logit model at column (2) and survival model at column (3) report Ohlson’s 
nine variables regression. We find that the coefficients on CL_CA (Current Liabilities 
divided by Current Assets), INTWO (equal to 1 if Net Income for the past two years is less 
than zero, and 0 otherwise) and OENEG (equal to 1 if Total Liabilities exceeds Total 
Assets, 0 otherwise) are significantly positive, while the coefficients on Net income/Total 
Assets (NI_TA) and change in Net Income (CHGIN) are negative in all of the models. 
Overall, the findings in Table 4 indicate that the five factors derived from financial 
statements, such as NI_TA, CL_CA, INTWO, OENEG, and CHGIN are the important 
17 
 
predictors of bankruptcy.14 Finally, we use the combined Altman’s and Ohlson’s variables 
(logit model 5 and survival model 6). In general, we get qualitatively similar results.  Most 
interestingly, we find that ownership 2 (collectively owned), ownership 3 (privately 
shareholder owned), ownership 4 (private personal capital), ownership 5 (firms in Hong 
Kong, Macao, and Taiwan), and ownership 6 (foreign-controlled businesses) in all models 
exhibit significantly positive coefficients. The results suggest that when compared to 
SOEs, collectively-owned enterprises, private-owned enterprises, and foreign owned 
businesses are more likely to file for bankruptcy. The lower incidence of bankruptcy rates 
in SOEs is not surprising, since SOEs benefit from a series of government preferences as 
documented in section II.  
 Taken together, the findings in Table 4 suggest that SOEs and firms with current 
liquidity problems and poorer accumulated firm profits have higher incidences of 
bankruptcy.    Overall, our bankruptcy prediction rates are round 89% and these rates are 
similar to those of previous U.S. studies such as Kwak et al.’s (2006) study.  
                 
VI. Summary and Conclusions 
 In this paper we adopt both logit and survival approaches to study the determinants 
of bankruptcy in China.  Using 1999-2007 Chinese bankruptcy data, our results suggest 
that firms with liquidity problems and firms experiencing decline in profits are more likely 
to file for bankruptcy. These results are similar to those of previous U.S. bankruptcy 
                                                     
14 We exclude Funds from Operations/Total Liabilities (FU/TL) in regression tests due to substantial missing 
observations for this variable. In our sensitivity test, we include this variable with a reduced sample and our 
major results still hold.   
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studies.   Most notably, we find that as compared to SOEs, collectively-owned enterprises, 
private-owned enterprises, and foreign owned businesses are more likely to file for 
bankruptcy. Our conclusion is robust after controlling for industry, year, and regional 
effects. The findings of our study show that the financial variables developed by Altman 
(1968) and Ohlson (1980) perform reasonably well in determining business failure in 
Chinese firms. 
 Our paper has several limitations.  First, we have to exclude 2001 and 2004 data 
because the definition of cancellation is not clear and it may not be the same as our 
definition of bankruptcy. Second, prior literature (Shumway 2001; Duffle et al. 2007; 
Campbell et al. 2008) shows that market information is critical in explaining the default 
risk of individual firms. However, due to data limitation we are unable to incorporate  
market return information in predicting business failure.  Finally, our sample is subject to 
selection bias because we collect only bankrupt firms as our experimental group and ten 
times of non-bankrupt firms to emulate real world.  Future studies may include stock 
return, internal control weakness, and dividend payout ratio as the determinants of 
bankruptcy.   
19 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of Chinese bankrupt firms between 1999 and 2007 
 
          Panel A: Bankrupt firms 
 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
SIZE 394 4.78 1.21 1.76 7.60 
TL_TA 394 0.72 0.36 0.01 2.80 
OENEG 394 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 
WCA_TA 394 0.00 0.44 -2.46 0.99 
CL_CA 394 1.61 3.54 0.00 43.49 
NI_TA 394 0.02 0.15 -1.37 0.85 
FU_TL 183 0.60 5.64 -3.25 75.25 
TP_TA 394 0.06 0.18 -1.32 1.09 
RE_TA 394 -0.03 0.42 -2.84 0.88 
BV_TD 394 1.81 8.18 -0.64 123.50 
SALE_TA 394 1.43 2.12 0.00 18.70 
INTWO 394 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 
CHIN 394 -0.08 0.72 -1.00 1.00 
Z-SCORE 394 2.66 6.07 -7.54 76.58 
 
 Panel B: Non-Bankrupt firms 
 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
  T-value 
Significance 
Level 
SIZE 3,263 4.83 1.17 1.62 8.04 0.56 
TL_TA 3,263 0.63 0.31 0.00 3.84 9.28*** 
OENEG 3,263 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 15.35*** 
WCA_TA 3,263 0.05 0.38 -1.73 7.49 0.7 
CL_CA 3,263 1.16 1.35 0.00 21.73 2.56* 
NI_TA 3,263 0.06 0.19 -0.78 3.42 10.86*** 
FU_TL 1,565 0.13 0.68 -4.58 9.94 1.26 
TP_TA 3,263 0.14 0.27 -0.75 3.89 26.62*** 
RE_TA 3,263 0.07 0.38 -10.72 0.95 2.82* 
BV_TD 3,263 2.14 8.56 -0.74 220.75 0.04 
SALE_TA 3,263 2.06 3.29 0.00 85.94 15.37*** 
INTWO 3,263 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00 11.71*** 
CHGIN 3,263 0.06 0.61 -1.00 1.00 9.43*** 
Z-SCORE 3,263 3.96 6.80 -12.69 137.87 3.95 *** 
 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***; and significant at 1% at the two-tailed test. 
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Variable Descriptions: 
 
Size = Total Assets divided by Gross Domestic Products from 1999 to 2007; 
TL_TA= Total Liabilities divided by Total Assets; 
OENEG= if TL_TA>1 then OENEG=1; else OENEG=0; 
WCA_TA=Working Capital divided by Total Assets; 
CL_CA=Total Current Liabilities divided by Total Current Assets; 
NI_TA=Net Income divided by Total Assets; 
FU_TL= Funds from Operations divided by Total Liabilities; 
TP_TA= Earnings Before Interest and Taxes divided by Total Assets; 
RE_TA = Retained Earnings divided by Total Assets; 
BV_TD = Stockholder’s Equity divided by Book Value of Total Debt; 
SALE_TA = Sales divided by Total Assets; 
INTWO= if lag (Net Income) < 0 or lag 2(Net Income) < 0 then INTWO =1; else INTWO  
                  = 0; 
CHGIN= (Net Income- lag (Net Income))/ [Absolute (Net Income) + Absolute (lag Net  
                   Income)]; and 
Z-score = Altman’s Z-score. 
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Table 2: Distribution of bankrupt firms by year and ownership 
 
Panel A: Distribution of bankrupt firms by year (2001 and 2004 are deleted). 
 
 
Year Number Percentage 
1999 12 3.05% 
2000 21 5.33% 
2002 55 13.96% 
2003 123 31.22% 
2005 73 18.53% 
2006 63 15.99% 
2007 47 11.93% 
Total 394 100.00% 
 
Panel B: Distribution of bankrupt firms by ownership 
 
Ownership  Number Percentage 
1 121 30.71% 
2 64 16.24% 
3 56 14.21% 
4 108 27.41% 
5 25 6.35% 
6 16 4.06% 
7 4 1.02% 
Total 394 100.00% 
 
Panel C: Distribution of bankrupt firms by ownership 
 
Region  Number Percentage 
East 250 63.45% 
Middle 112 28.43% 
West 32 8.12% 
Total 394 100.00% 
 
Ownership 1: State-owned enterprises;  
Ownership 2: Collectively owned; 
Ownership 3: Private, share holding;  
Ownership 4: Private, personal capital; 
Ownership 5: Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan (HKMT);  
Ownership 6: foreign-owned businesses; and 
Ownership 7: others. 
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Table 3: Pearson Correlation of Bankruptcy Determinants (data ranges are in Table 1) 
  
  SIZE TL_TA OENEG WCA_TA CL_CA NI_TA FU_TL TP_TA RE_TA BEV_TD SALE_TA INTWO CHGIN 
SIZE 1.00             
TL_TA -0.03 1.00            
OENEG -0.09 0.53 1.00           
WCA_TA -0.04 -0.64 -0.34 1.00          
CL_CA 0.06 0.26 0.10 -0.50 1.00         
NI_TA -0.13 -0.24 -0.16 0.17 -0.09 1.00        
FU_TL -0.03 -0.11 -0.02 0.07 -0.04 0.07 1.00       
TP_TA -0.22 -0.21 -0.13 0.14 -0.08 0.86 0.07 1.00      
RE_TA 0.13 -0.64 -0.47 0.46 -0.18 0.23 0.07 0.18 1.00     
BEV_TD 0.03 -0.37 -0.08 0.20 -0.11 0.05 0.21 0.04 0.15 1.00    
SALE_TA -0.33 -0.11 -0.07 0.15 -0.08 0.43 0.11 0.59 0.09 0.01 1.00   
INTWO 0.01 0.25 0.31 -0.25 0.11 -0.27 -0.03 -0.24 -0.33 -0.07 -0.14 1.00  
CHGIN 0.03 -0.06 -0.06 0.05 -0.04 0.25 0.01 0.21 0.05 0.00 0.07 -0.02 1.00 
 
SIZE =Total Assets divided by Gross Domestic Products; 
TL_TA=Total Liabilities divided by Total Assets; 
OENEG= if TL_TA>1 then OENEG=1; else OENEG=0; 
WCA_TA=Working Capital divided by Total Assets; 
CL_CA= Total Current Liabilities divided by Total Current Assets; 
NI_TA= Net Income divided by Total Assets; 
FU_TL=Funds from Operations divided by Total Liabilities; 
TP_TA= Earnings Before Interest and Taxes divided by Total Assets; 
RE_TA = Retained Earnings divided by Total Assets; 
BEV_TD = Stockholder’s Equity divided by Book Value of Total Debt; 
SALE_TA = Sales divided by Total Assets; 
INTWO= if lag(Net Income) <0 or lag2(Net Income) <0 then INTWO=1; else INTWO=0; 
CHGIN= (Net Income- lag (Net Income))/ [Absolute (Net Income) + Absolute (lag Net Income)]; 
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Table 4: The Determinants of Bankcrupcy 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6
logit: Altman survival: Altman logit: Olsen survival: Olsen logit: combined survival: combined
WCA_TA -0.200 0.182 0.295 -0.133 0.298 0.480
(0.204) (0.179) (0.244) (0.232) (0.213) (0.255)*
RE_TA -0.173 0.001 -0.365 -0.089
(0.104)* (0.133) (0.269) (0.172)
TP_TA -1.394 -2.983 -1.791 -3.551
(0.273)*** (1.484)** (0.376)*** (1.547)**
BV_TD 0.005 0.008 -0.000 0.003
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
SALE_TA -0.070 -0.085 -0.074 -0.092
(0.039)* (0.045)* (0.043)* (0.050)*
size -0.066 -0.151 -0.020 -0.115
(0.040) (0.056)*** (0.032) (0.050)**
TL_TA 0.175 0.368 0.225 0.359
(0.273) (0.317) (0.293) (0.337)
CL_CA 0.060 0.060 0.109 0.119
(0.010)*** (0.012)*** (0.020)*** (0.021)***
NI_TA -0.784 2.914 -1.310 3.273
(0.377)** (1.658)* (0.540)** (1.853)*
INTWO 0.132 0.096 0.163 0.142
(0.189) (0.189) (0.220) (0.220)
OENEG 0.731 0.686 0.854 0.819
(0.184)*** (0.184)*** (0.201)*** (0.209)***
CHGIN -0.287 -0.285 -0.256 -0.258
(0.076)*** (0.081)*** (0.092)*** (0.090)***
Ownership 2 0.255 0.198 0.262 0.287 0.224 0.296
(0.107)** (0.104)* (0.123)** (0.101)*** (0.100)** (0.121)**
Ownership 3 0.237 0.257 0.361 0.047 0.065 0.169
(0.128)* (0.157) (0.152)** (0.094) (0.115) (0.118)
Ownership 4 0.842 0.786 0.926 0.363 0.326 0.491
(0.099)*** (0.100)*** (0.114)*** (0.105)*** (0.096)*** (0.119)***
Ownership 5 0.412 0.549 0.560 0.253 0.400 0.391
(0.138)*** (0.142)*** (0.148)*** (0.146)* (0.157)** (0.161)**
Ownership 6 0.419 0.614 0.641 0.359 0.520 0.538
(0.176)** (0.153)*** (0.148)*** (0.145)** (0.195)*** (0.175)***
Ownership 7 1.132 1.206 1.330 1.422 1.566 1.699
(0.205)*** (0.315)*** (0.290)*** (0.269)*** (0.366)*** (0.354)***
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -3.103 -3.273 -2.523 -1.837 -2.291 -1.440
(0.223)*** (0.297)*** (0.474)*** (0.231)*** (0.305)*** (0.513)***
AIC  1367.676 1346.928 1325.006 2428.738 2409.214 2384.558
Correctly predicted  89.17% 89.26% 89.26%
Observations 3593 3593 3593 3621 3621 3621
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 4: Determinants of bankruptcy using Logit and Survival models 
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